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a b s t r a c t
In the maritime domain, risk is evaluated within the framework of the Formal Safety Assessment (FSA),
introduced by the International Maritime Organization in 2002. Although the FSA has become an
internationally recognized and recommended method, the deﬁnition, which is adopted there, to
describe the risk, seems to be too narrow to reﬂect the actual content of the FSA.
Therefore this article discusses methodological requirements for the risk perspective, which is
appropriate for risk management in the maritime domain with special attention to maritime
transportation systems. A perspective that is proposed here considers risk as a set encompassing the
following: a set of plausible scenarios leading to an accident, the likelihoods of unwanted events within
the scenarios, the consequences of the events and description of uncertainty. All these elements are
conditional upon the available knowledge (K) about the analyzed system and understanding (N) of the
system behavior. Therefore, the quality of K and the level of N of a risk model should be reﬂected in the
uncertainty description. For this purpose we introduce a qualitative scoring system, and we show its
applicability on an exemplary risk model for a RoPax ship.
& 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-SA
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/).
1. Introduction
In 2002 the International Maritime Organization (IMO)
approved guidelines for the Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) as a
method of evaluating risk in the maritime domain. The FSA has
been described there as “a rational and systematic process for
assessing the risks associated with shipping activity and for evaluat-
ing the costs and beneﬁts of IMO's options for reducing these risks”
[1,2]. However, in a recent review on the FSA, Psaraftis expresses a
need for scientiﬁc discussion in the maritime domain about a
number of fundamental issues concerning the FSA [3]. In parti-
cular, he sees a need for uniﬁcation of the applied terminology,
discussion on the development of risk models and how to report
FSA studies. These ﬁndings are reminiscent of the perspective of
Aven, who calls for a continuous scientiﬁc discussion on under-
standing, expressing and communicating risk, see for example
[4,5].
The basic philosophy of the FSA is that it can be used as a tool
to facilitate a transparent decision-making process. In addition, it
provides a mean of being proactive, enabling potential hazards to
be considered before a serious accident occurs. However, the
description of the method can give an impression that the
deﬁnition of the word “risk” does not fully reﬂect the way the
risk is further explained and it seems that the components
relevant for risk description change depending on the context.
In the context of risk analysis, presented in the FSA guidelines
risk is deﬁned as a combination of the probability (P) and
consequences (C) of a given action [6]. Further in the guidelines,
in Chapter 7 “Risk control options”, the risk is decomposed and the
uncertainty aspect of two risk components (P, C) is added as an
important element of the decision process. Moreover, for the
identiﬁcation of risk control measures, Sub-chapter 7.2.2 suggests
developing causal chains of events leading to an accident, which
means that the deﬁnition of risk includes an insight into certain
scenarios leading to the undesired situations. Finally, Chapter 10,
“Presentation of FSA results”, stresses the need for a discussion
about the assumptions, limitations and uncertainties of a
risk model.
It has been argued that the FSA, presented as a proactive, highly
technical and complex method, can be misused, yielding results
which may not fully reﬂect the relevant features of the analyzed
system, see for example [7,8]. To facilitate a more coherent
framing of what the FSA as a tool expects from an analysis, it
may be beneﬁcial to adopt a more systematic risk perspective,
which incorporates the various aspects of the risk description. This
could help to make sure that all these relevant recommendations,
which are located in different chapters of the guidelines, can be
properly addressed at the appropriate stages of the risk analysis.
Therefore this paper serves the purpose of adding to the
discussion asked for by Psaraftis and Aven. It proposes the
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requirements for a risk perspective, which is suitable for the
maritime domain and meets all the requirements given in the
FSA guidelines. The proposed perspective is an extension of a
concept by Kaplan and Garrick [9] which has been developed
further by Flage and Aven, see [10]. This perspective relates risk to
a set comprising the following: events forming scenarios leading
to consequences of interest, the probabilities of the events, the
consequences, uncertainty, sensitivity and background knowledge.
The novelty of the approach is related to the last element of this
set, namely background knowledge (BK). In the literature on risk
in socio-technical systems BK is deﬁned as a mixture of knowledge
and understanding, see for example [10–12]. In the philosophical
debate, knowledge is separated from understanding, and the latter
is taken as the central concept of epistemology, rather than
propositional knowledge, see [13]. As knowledge (K) and under-
standing (N) are two different concepts they represent different
aspects of uncertainty related to an analyzed system. This distinc-
tion between K and N implies a revision of the scoring system for
uncertainty proposed in earlier work [5,10,14]. Thus an alternative
methodology for uncertainty assessment is presented for consid-
eration in future risk studies; moreover it meets a call for research
on methods to communicate uncertainties [5,3].
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Chapter 2 introduces knowledge and understanding and high-
lights the main differences between these two concepts. In
Chapter 3 we elaborate on a risk perspective, which would
accommodate all the requirements of the FSA. In Chapter 4 we
demonstrate how to implement knowledge and understanding in
a risk perspective. An example from the maritime is given in
Chapter 5, which is followed by concluding remarks.
2. Knowledge and understanding
2.1. Knowledge
Knowledge is widely identiﬁed with propositional knowledge
and analyzed in terms of justiﬁed, true belief. The growth of
knowledge is seen as cognitive advancement and it is accom-
plished by the acquisition of new justiﬁed, true beliefs that satisfy
the additional condition.
Knowledge focuses on believing a proposition, which could not
easily have been false, which means that K is factive. To acquire
knowledge about events, ﬁrst the events need to exist. Second, one
needs to refer to reliable sources to learn about these events.
However, there are suggestions among epistemologists to take
understanding rather than propositional knowledge as the central
concept of epistemology, see for example [15]. It is argued that the
main goal of our cognitive process is not to acquire knowledge as
justiﬁed true beliefs but to advance our understanding. Moreover,
propositional knowledge is an important part of understanding a
phenomenon. Hence, the epistemology of understanding has to
comprise an account of propositional knowledge, see for example [15].
2.2. Understanding
Getting knowledge is important, but aspiring toward understand-
ing is more ambitious. Besides knowing the important and relevant
truths that belong to the comprehensive, coherent body of a domain
and comprehending the appropriate ﬁctions (e.g. idealizations,
thought experiments), understanding comprises grasping how the
various truths and ﬁctions relate to each other. Moreover, with
understanding we are able to use information to (see [15]):
 argue within the framework of the account,
 apply its results to new situations,
 assess and acknowledge its limits,
 devise suitable (thought) experiments, and
 ask new questions unto which the account does not yet provide
conclusive answers.
Baumberger in his recent work [15,16] lists four main features –
described in the following sub-sections – which make under-
standing different from knowledge. These four reasons clearly
indicate that knowledge and understanding are two concepts
having different focuses. Moreover, each of the concepts can be
related to speciﬁc difﬁculties in risk modeling, and it is considered
useful to make the different difﬁculties explicit.
2.2.1. Not a species of belief
Understanding is not a species of belief. Its content cannot even
be fully explicated as a collection of beliefs since it involves grasping
connections between beliefs, non-belief states like questions, non-
propositional commitments like categories and non-verbal symbols,
as well as having certain cognitive abilities, see [15].
2.2.2. Holistic
Understanding is holistic. Knowledge can be broken down into
discrete bits. It is knowledge of an individual fact, expressed by a
proposition. The proposition is true; the knower believes the
proposition and his belief is justiﬁed. If the content or the
justiﬁcation of a belief is taken to depend on relations it bears to
experiences and other beliefs of the knower, this may introduce a
holistic element. But even if knowledge is partly holistic, under-
standing is wholly holistic. It cannot be broken down into discrete
bits. It is the understanding of a whole domain or topic, expressed
in a more or less complex account or theory containing proposi-
tional and non-propositional elements. The account or theory
answers to the facts and the understander is committed to it
and justiﬁed in it.
By gaining an understanding about the system one becomes
familiar with the way the system operates. This enables him to
construct a model reﬂecting the actual behavior of the system to
the extent he is interested in, simply by putting the right variables
in the right order.
2.2.3. Gradual
Unlike knowledge, understanding is gradual. For any fact,
either one knows it or one does not know it. But understanding
admits degrees. Understanding can vary at least in breath, depth,
signiﬁcance and accuracy.1
2.2.4. Not factive
In contrast to knowledge, understanding is not factive. One can
only know A if “A” is true. But one's understanding can involve
propositions that are not true, and some of them may even belong
to the central propositions that constitute the account of the topic.
As claimed in Section 2.2.3, understanding can be more or less
accurate, due to its gradualism.
Even if understanding is not factive, it must, of course, answer
to the facts by accommodating the evidence. But since under-
standing is holistic, accommodating the evidence is a requirement
on the entire theory, not on each individual element of it2.
1 Novices in the ﬁeld as well as scientists start out with crude characterizations
that properly direct them towards their topic and then reﬁne these characteriza-
tions. Their advancement of understanding involves a move from beliefs that are
strictly false but in the right neighborhood to beliefs that are closer to the truth.
This development may result in true beliefs. But even an earlier step displays some
measure of understanding.
2 Hence, understanding a topic does not imply that all central beliefs that
constitute our theory are true. Even mature science is full of idealizations and
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There are several reasons for understanding not to be factive
[16,17]
 in complex systems there are numerous causes of A which
interact in complicated manners; therefore it is difﬁcult to
address all of the causes or we can determine them more or
less accurately;
 when describing A we make idealizations, which can degrade
our understanding but does not destroy it; and
 understanding admits degrees, meaning that with each step in
the sequence we understand an analyzed phenomenon better
than we did before.
In non-factive cases we have some understanding of A without
knowing all facts about A, which means that despite not posses-
sing full knowledge about A we have an understanding of A which
can be enough for a reliable inference about A.
Knowledge is about facts; understanding is about the real
meaning of the facts. We might know something to be true, but
we need understanding to realize why it is true and what is the
impact of that truth. If we know that B is a reason for an event A
(we know why A happens), we have the basis for believing that A
is because of B. But when we understand why A happens, we
additionally obtain a grasp on how B affects A. By getting this
comprehension about A we are able to
 develop an explanatory story about how B can cause or be a
reason for A;
 infer about B knowing A; and
 for some An and Bn, which are similar but not identical to A and
B, draw a conclusion about An assuming Bn, and give the right
explanation for Bn assuming An.
As the risk is about future events, the ability to grasp explana-
tory relations between elements in the modeled system in order to
infer about the system in the future is crucial. As we in practice do
not posses facts about the future, thus our knowledge about the
future states of the world implies assumptions, which come from
our understanding of the world. This means that risk perspective
inherently contains understanding in larger proportion than
knowledge.
3. Describing risk
While often not clearly enough distinguished, there is a funda-
mental difference between the concept of risk and ways to
describe risk. We adopt the following terminology:
 the risk concept concerns what risk means in itself, what
risk “is”;
 a risk perspective is a way to describe risk, a systematic manner
to analyze and make statements about risk; and
 a risk metric is the assignment of a numerical value to an aspect
of risk according to a certain standard or rule. Risk metrics, e.g.
address the likelihood of an event occurrence or the conse-
quence severity, or derivations such as expected values.
The FSA deﬁnes risk as a combination of the probability (P) of
an accident and its consequences (C) as follows:
R¼ ðP;CÞ ð1Þ
As a risk metric the FSA proposes a risk index (RI), which is deﬁned
more explicitly as a product of P and C:
Risk index¼ Probability Consequence log ðrisk indexÞ
¼ log ðprobabilityÞþ log ðconsequenceÞ ð2Þ
The RI serves the purpose of being a crude risk indicator used for
ranking various hazards and selecting the most relevant ones,
which are then analyzed in detail. However, the same deﬁnition is
often adopted among engineers to describe risk itself, see for
example [18,19]. However, it easily leads to confusion, especially
when comparing two situations A and B, where
 A encompasses frequent events resulting in minor conse-
quences – single or minor injuries and local equipment
damage;
 B considers a remote event of catastrophic consequence –
multiple fatalities and total loss of a ship.
Even though the products of P and C in both cases are the same
– following the FSA guidelines the risk indices are the same, RI¼7
– these two situations differ substantially. The available informa-
tion about A is most likely better than in the case of B, as A occurs
more frequently – it is likely to occur once per month on one ship.
B occurs rarely – once per year in a ﬂeet of 1000 ships – or is likely
to occur in the total life of several similar ships; for the adopted
classiﬁcation, see [2]. The amount of information available about A
and B affects the level of uncertainty associated with the descrip-
tions of A and B. Also the measures to control the risks in these
two situations are probably different, as in the ﬁrst case the focus
might be given to P, and in the second case C might be subject to
mitigation. Therefore, interpreting risk simply as a product of P
and C leads to the misconception that risk is just a number, which
is divorced from the scenarios of concern. Applying this perspec-
tive, much of the relevant information needed for risk manage-
ment is not properly reﬂected or even missing [5].
Thereby, a wider concept of risk should in our view be applied,
allowing a systematic and hierarchical description of the risk and
reasoning in light of available knowledge and a possessed under-
standing about the analyzed system and its behavior.
In the scientiﬁc literature there have been numerous proposed
deﬁnitions for risk; for a recent and thorough review of the risk
concepts, see for example [5,11,20]. By studying the different risk
deﬁnitions, regarding socio-technical systems, we found that
many scientists perceive risk as a logic construct referring to
future events or situations resulting in an outcome, which is
deﬁnable but uncertain, which puts at stake something that
humans value. This means that risk refers to the future but it is
managed in the present, based on experience gained in the past.
An appropriate starting point to describe risk, which also ﬁts in
the maritime domain, has been introduced by Kaplan and Garrick
[9], where risk is presented as a complete set of triplets:
R¼ fSi; Li;CigC ; ð3Þ
The triplets attempt to answer the following questions: what can
go wrong in the system (Scenario – S), how likely is it that it goes
wrong (Likelihood – L), and what are the consequences if the
assumed scenario happens (Consequence – C)? However, describ-
ing the risk as a complete set of triplets is unattainable, simply
because our knowledge on the system is never complete, and
therefore the system cannot be characterized exactly, see [21].
What we actually attempt to describe is an incomplete set of
triplets, called “a set of answers”. This set reﬂects the risk in a
(footnote continued)
thought experiments. In contrast to the more or less crude characterizations, they
are not in need of improvement and not supposed to be eliminable from scientiﬁc
theories.
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given system according to our best knowledge (K) about the
system and our understanding (N) of its behavior; however,
certain triplets, yet existing, remain undiscovered and thus they
cannot be captured. But if our K or N improves, new scenarios can
be deﬁned and added to the triplet, and therefore the incomplete-
ness of the risk set which is conditional upon K and N should be
recognized. Due to this incompleteness, the notation of risk shifts
from “a risk is equal to a set” to “a risk is described by a set”, and
the conditional dependency upon K and N is added as follows:
R fsi; li; cigjfK ;Ng; ð4Þ
Δ fK;Ng: ð5Þ
The construct Δ represents a set comprising the knowledge
dimension and the understanding dimension. The former
addresses the facts, or true justiﬁed beliefs, which cannot easily
be false regarding the elements of a modeled system, which are
included in a risk model. The latter refers to both the facts and
non-facts describing the ways in which the modeled system is
explained to work.
In a more general way, adapting the deﬁnition of risk given by
Aven in [21], the description of risk can take the following form:
R fA;C;QgjΔ : ð6Þ
Following this notation, risk description should contain scenarios
composed of events (A), the consequences (C) if a scenario
becomes true and uncertainty analysis (Q). The last one reﬂects
the basis for assigning the probabilities for A and aims at the
assessment of the effect that the limited Δ has on the outcome of
the risk model. Therefore, Q also contains the sensitivity analysis
and parameter importance scoring, as suggested in [22]. All the
elements of risk description are conditional uponΔ, as the level of
K and N determines how certain we are about A and C. As shown
in Section 2, K and N are two different concepts; they represent
different aspects of the uncertainty related to an analyzed system.
This distinction between K and N implies a revision of the scoring
system for uncertainty proposed in earlier work [5,10,14]. An
alternative methodology for uncertainty assessment is presented
and discussed in the following section.
In the cases where maritime transportation systems are ana-
lyzed, usually the consequences of the analysis are well deﬁned
(e.g. collision, groundings, ﬁre, environmental pollution, loss of
life). When it comes to the basis for assigning probabilities,
however, this may be problematic. The main reason is that some
paths of the scenario – links between events – are better under-
stood than others, or the knowledge about certain events is better
than about others. This creates uncertainties (Q) with respect to
variables (parameter uncertainty) and links (structural uncer-
tainty), which can be reduced either by gaining K or improving
N. Parameter uncertainty can be addressed by improving K about
parameters, getting new evidence or learning about that from
available data sources if possible. However, structural uncertainty
is associated with the level of understanding of the modeled
domain. Thus, the inﬂuence of K and N on the level and type
of uncertainty needs to be determined, along with the source of
uncertainty. To provide a more comprehensive risk picture, a
sensitivity analysis of the model needs to be performed, which
determines the elements of a model, which if changed may
signiﬁcantly alter the model output. The elements, which are
uncertain and the model is sensitive toward them, need to be
pointed out and their potential effects on risk evaluated. This step
is tantamount to parameter importance scoring, as presented by
Milazzo and Aven in [14].
Adopting such a risk perspective, systematic uncertainty
decomposition and treatment is allowed, which is more than just
mentioning the assumptions, limitations and uncertainties of a
risk model as suggested by the FSA [6]. It allows quantiﬁcation of
the effects of different assumptions and imprecise knowledge
about variables on risk, as well as a systematic qualitative assess-
ment of the knowledge and understanding on which the risk
model is based. Moreover by distributing K and N across a risk
model, we can identify the areas of insufﬁcient K and/or N, which
need further research. It furthermore provides insight into the
conﬁdence one has about the effectiveness of proposed risk control
options (RCOs). RCOs working in areas where the K and/or N is
limited should not be given equal weight as RCOs working in areas
where the K and/or N is more extensive. Thus, appropriate reﬂection
on K and N can have a signiﬁcant impact on the kind of adopted risk
management strategies.
Moreover, in some cases where K is low but N is sufﬁcient we
may ﬁnd that the level of Q is low or medium. This can be the case
where an analyst understands the phenomena but the facts about
it are fragmented and require additional justiﬁed assumptions.
This may lead an analyst to make a projection of the system in the
proper direction, as he understands the phenomena; however, the
magnitude of risk can be burdened with some uncertainty.
On the contrary, in the presence of high K but low N, it can
happen that the Q is classiﬁed as high. This is especially the case
when the available data is not necessarily applicable in the future,
and the lack of understanding prevents an assessor from making a
proper projection of the present state of a system into the future.
This means that both the direction of projection and magnitude of
risk are highly uncertain and surprises may easily occur.
However, according to the existing scoring system – see [10,14]
– the level of Q in both cases discussed above is moderate. This
shows that the risk perspective that is proposed here needs its
own uncertainty scoring system, as a distinction between K and N
is not anticipated in the existing solutions. Moreover, we show
that very often K is not available at all, following the classical
deﬁnition of knowledge. This means that in such cases it is N
which drives risk models.
4. Incorporation of knowledge and understanding into a risk
perspective
In this section we show how to incorporate K and N in a risk
model through scenarios, following the risk perspective adopted.
Moreover, we discuss the possible ways to describe the effect of
uncertainty associated with the parameters and structure of a
model on risk metric. Finally we introduce the concept of an
uncertainty scoring system for a risk model, which is an extension
of a system originally introduced by Flage and Aven in [10].
4.1. Scenarios
A fundamental and very likely the most important stage of any
risk analysis which in turn affects all the steps following the
analysis is scenario identiﬁcation, meaning the proper translation
of K and N into a model. Intuitively, the importance of this step
seems obvious; however, it does not always receive due credit, see
for example [3,23,24]. When describing risk the main focus is on
understanding these scenarios, which ultimately lead to undesired
events. Scenario identiﬁcation is tantamount to discovering caus-
ality, which seems to be the natural way of understanding,
analyzing and ﬁnally mitigating hazardous situations, which
produce risks. This mindset has been successfully adopted in the
nuclear power industry and the process industry; moreover it is
successfully pursued in air transportation, see [25–27]. In recent
years some researchers made attempts to follow this way to
improve maritime safety as well, see for example [28,29].
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A scenario can be deﬁned as a realization of a chain of events
– see also [6] – triggered by an initiating event (IE). The IE
may cause the system to move from its predeﬁned safe and
efﬁcient trajectory (S0) towards the set of trajectories (Si) which
are not as safe and effective as S0, but it does not mean they
are all unsafe. The system being on its trajectory Si travels
through various mid-states (MS) at which transitions take place,
redirecting the system towards the end states. The latter can be
either an undesired event, like an accident, or safe operation
of MTS, which means that the system may return at some point
to S0. A scenario encompasses various events (variables), which
are linked with mathematical functions of varying complexities
– from the simple Boolean logic to multivariable functions.
Each scenario consists of two parts: qualitative and quantitative.
The quantitative part reﬂects the content of the scenario, and is
described by events, whereas the relations between the events
are characterized by the scenario’s structure, which refers
to its qualitative part. This means that each single scenario
requires from an analyst proper understanding of the modeled
system.
For many complex systems, such as the maritime transporta-
tion system (MTS), the levels of our K and N of the analyzed
scenarios vary and usually are not equally spread over a scenario,
as we know and understand more about a given part of the
scenario than about the others. This is especially important to
realize when it comes to determining the RCOs and deﬁning the
locations for these in a risk model. If we decide to place RCOs
somewhere along a path that is considered poorly understood,
then their effect in the real world may be completely different
from that anticipated in a model. By representing K and N along a
scenario
 we identify the areas of a system that we can model accurately
and the areas for which a qualitative approach is more
appropriate;
 we deﬁne the weak paths of a scenario, which should be
treated with caution, especially if the outcome of the scenario
is sensitive to the changes along these paths;
 we decompose a scenario into smaller pieces, to avoid proble-
matic links, and focus on modeling events which are better
understood;
 we demonstrate the effect of improper K and/or N on a model's
outcome.
The description of a scenario should shed some lights on the
process of failure evolution, specifying the sets of associated IEs,
MSs and ESs. There will be inevitably smaller or larger portions of
the scenarios remaining uncovered; however, the uncertainties
associated with these scenarios may be smaller than their counter-
parts associated with the set of scenarios developed on assump-
tions not supported by the available information.
In the ﬁrst case, the analysis is based on the observation of
system behavior in the past; thus it is limited to the known events,
which caused the MTS failure. However, if we manage to represent
properly the available knowledge and grasp an understanding of a
system we can get a canvas for a predictive model determining the
critical paths of the system leading to an accident in the future.
Therefore, the uncertainty of this approach would be mostly
associated with not observed IEs, MSs, ESs and links between
those forming an unknown set of scenario paths.
Whereas, in the case where the description of a system is not
based on evidence, nor is utilizing available information properly
or is lacking understanding of the system behavior, the gap
between a real system and its description becomes unidentiﬁable,
and surprises may occur, see for example [5,30].
4.2. Quantiﬁcation of uncertainty
We take a stand, that the uncertainty is a result of our limited
knowledge and understanding of the modeled system, which is in
line with the commonly adopted claim that the uncertainty is a
function of the available information on a given system in a given
situation, see also [23,31–33].
The lack of knowledge about the analyzed system usually leads
to uncertainty in the model parameters, see [21,34]. But lack of
understanding of the system behavior is far more critical, as
through understanding an analyst is able to do the following:
 structure the model;
 make statements about the hypotheses supporting the model;
 formulate sound assumptions; and
 assess the knowledge about the model parameters.
It is relevant for a risk framework to communicate the extent of
the knowledge about the phenomena analyzed, see [1,22,35];
however, the level of system understanding must also be there,
as it allows structured analysis of uncertainties involved in a
model of the analyzed phenomena. Besides quantiﬁcation of the
uncertainties we determine their nature and distribute them
across the model to determine the areas of the model in which
the bulk of uncertainty sits.
The description of risk can be considered plausible and useful for
decision makers only to the extent that it addresses the limitations in
the available K and N and demonstrates their effect on a risk metric.
There are numerous ways to address and express the model
uncertainty depending on its type; for the quantitative approaches,
see for example [36–38]. However, the qualitative descriptions are
often postulated as well, see for example [5,10,14].
In the context of risk analysis, both types of uncertainty descrip-
tions are needed in our view. Firstly, a crude quality check is made of
the available K and N based on existing theories, information and
data. This allows an initial model check, if the available level of K and
Nmakes it possible to formulate any reliable statement about risk. As
a result of this step, an uncertainty matrix can be drawn, where all
the elements of a risk model are systematically evaluated and ranked,
following an adopted scoring system. This step delivers answers
about the degree of uncertainty, which can be classiﬁed as high,
medium or low. This shall be accompanied with the sensitivity
analysis of a risk model, which determines the elements of a model,
which if changed may signiﬁcantly alter the model output. Then, the
elements, which are uncertain and the model is sensitive toward
them, need to be pointed out and their potential effects on risk
quantiﬁed. This step is called importance scoring.
If an element of a risk model gets a high importance score,
it means that the available knowledge and understanding of
analyzed phenomena signiﬁcantly affect risk metrics. An attempt
can be made to quantify this effect, to get an indication about the
magnitude of the spread in risk metrics. By performing such an
inﬂuence analysis, one may eliminate some of the potential
surprises. In order to determine the effect of K and N on model
outcome, the following steps are proposed:
(1) Develop a model structure along with a set of relevant
parameters, which, however, can take different states or can
be governed by more than one hypothesis. These alternatives
reﬂect understanding of an analyst, and can be referred to as
alternative hypotheses testing, see for example [39].
(2) Perform quantitative uncertainty analysis (QUA) of the model(s).
(3) Perform sensitivity analysis for each model (SA) to specify the
variables, which are important for the model, as their varia-
bility affects the model outcome the most. The results of the
SA may be different for two models, which have the same
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quantitative parts (variables) but differ in qualitative descrip-
tion (structure).
(4) Determine parameter importance (PI), based on adopted
scoring system.
(5) Report the results of uncertainty analysis QUA in the light of PI.
By applying this procedure we perform an extended quantita-
tive uncertainty analysis of a risk model. To run the above
procedure efﬁciently appropriate modeling techniques need to
be applied, allowing for quick reasoning and model updating in
light of new information, for example Bayesian Belief Networks.
4.3. Qualitative uncertainty assessment
In this section we present a scoring system for the qualitative
uncertainty assessment. This system is an extension of the scoring
system proposed in [5,10,14]. However, the system presented here
features novelty, as it accounts for the joint effect of the level of
knowledge and the quality of understanding of an analyst on the
uncertainty of a risk model.
The main idea of the scoring system is to assign a qualitative
description for the quality of K and the level of N to each and every
element of the model (including the relations between elements)
using the hierarchical description. Each element of the model and
relations between the elements are evaluated with respect to the
evidence, which is used to describe the element:
 the data, models and theories – these are factual and allow an
analyst to formulate statements about the risk model – K; and
 assumptions, judgments and the ability to assess the level of
knowledge about the element – these are not necessarily
factual – N.
The following category classiﬁcation is applied for the qualita-
tive uncertainty scoring system: high, medium, low.
The presented classiﬁers are crude and can be case-speciﬁc and
subject to judgments by the analyst; nevertheless they could serve
as a guideline (see also [10]):
Quality of knowledge (K):
Good
 Data is reliable and/or
 Engineering model is accurate and/or
 Scientiﬁc theory is broadly accepted
Poor
 Data is unreliable
 Engineering model is a crude estimate
 Scientiﬁc theory is contested
Moderate
Conditions between those characterizing K as Good and Poor
Level of understanding (N):
High
 Assumption is broadly accepted among peers and/or
 Judgment is broadly accepted among peers and/or
 Assessor can well justify the ranking of K
Low
 Assumption is contested among peers
 Judgment is contested among peers
 Assessor cannot properly justify the ranking of K
Medium
Conditions between those characterizing K as Good and Poor.
Combining these two in a two-dimensional matrix, a classiﬁca-
tion table for degree of uncertainty is worked out, as presented in
Table 1.
A high degree of uncertainty means situations where an analyst
cannot formulate any reliable conclusions based on a risk model.
There is no common understanding of modeled phenomena. Also,
the uncertainty can be classiﬁed as high in the presence of knowl-
edge about certain elements of the modeled system or phenomena
if, at the same time, one does not know the relations between
elements, or various experts would quantify the relations in differ-
ent ways. This means that in the presence of knowledge but lack of
understanding of the degree of uncertainty is high, as one cannot
produce any reliable future projection of the present situation.
Giving as an example a maritime transportation system, we
know the number of accidents (N_a) that have happened in the
past, we know the volume and composition of trafﬁc (V), and we
also know the long-term and short-term trends (T) for the number
of accidents in the area. These are facts – obviously to consider
them as facts we shall assume for instance that the accidents are
reported and recorded properly, meaning that the accident data-
base does not contain any mistakes or cases which are double-
classiﬁed and the issue of underreporting does not exist. Despite
some of the above-mentioned assumptions not being true, we can
still accept the existing data as facts, simply as we do not have
anything else. This means that these “facts” are observable and
measurable; they constitute our K about the parameters of an
analyzed system and provide a solid basis for variables, which can
be used in a model of the system. However, despite extensive K
about crucial elements of the analyzed system, we need to have a
grasp of how the amount of trafﬁc (V) affects the number of
accidents (N_a) to understand the trend (T).
To understand a phenomenon a person needs to grasp expla-
natory connections; this in turn requires certain abilities, for
instance an adeptness in using the information one has, not
merely an appreciation that things are so [18]. Thus, grasping V
as a cause of N_a is not the same as correctly believing that N_a
occurs because of V. Moreover, to understand this we must
address the facts. If the link between V and N_a is not clear, it
means that our understanding of the effect that V has on N_a is
limited or does not exist.
The implication of the above is that despite our knowledge of
the crucial elements of the system (V, N_a, and T), the lack of
understanding of the system behavior prevents us from making a
reliable inference about the future behavior of the system, if it is
based only on these variables.
5. An example
This section presents an example of the qualitative uncertainty
assessment of a simpliﬁed risk model for a ship carrying passengers
(RoPax), which is involved in an open-sea collision. For a detailed
Table 1




High L L M
Medium L M M
Low H H H
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description of the model, the reader is referred to [40], whereas
Fig. 1 summarizes the model.
This model estimates the risk in a certain sea area, focusing on
a selected accidental scenario that, ultimately, leads to the loss of a
struck RoPax ship. This accidental scenario is a breach of the inner
hull of the RoPax that is struck by another ship and the consequent
ﬂooding; this can further result in the loss of the ship. The loss of
the RoPax is expected if two consecutive limits are exceeded,
namely crashworthiness and stability. Subsequently the corre-
sponding probabilities of the limits being exceeded given the
trafﬁc and environmental conditions are evaluated on the basis
of the model. For this purposes the following general factors are
taken into consideration: the composition of the maritime trafﬁc
in the sea area being analyzed, the collision dynamics, the
hydrodynamics of the ship and her loading conditions.
Ultimately, the cumulative number of fatalities (N) resulting from
the accident is modeled utilizing the concept of the rate of fatalities.
This rate is determined taking into account the time for evacuating a
ship and the time for a ship to capsize. The number of passengers on
board is modeled utilizing available data from RoPax operators from
the analyzed sea area. All these, along with the associated probabil-
ities (P) for a given number of fatalities, are depicted in a F–N
diagram, which can be considered as a risk metric.
In Fig. 1 three colors are used to make a distinction among
variables which are obtained from the numerical simulations
(blue), those taken from the literature (yellow), those based on
certain assumptions (gray) or purely conditional on their parents
(without ﬁlling).
Whereas, Table 2 lists all the elements of the model, along with
the central evidence, on which the elements are quantiﬁed,
allowing for the uncertainty assessment.
The results of the qualitative uncertainty assessment are
tabulated in Table 3. Information about the sensitivity of the
model toward each parameter is added. This information is
obtained quantitatively from the modeling environment where
the risk model was developed; however, the translation into a
qualitative scale needs to be made by an analyst. By combining the
uncertainty score with the sensitivity score a metric for parameter
importance is obtained. This metric informs an analyst about the
weak elements of a risk model, which either needs improvement,
or if this is not possible analysts should be very open about them.
Moreover, with this metric an analyst can elaborate on the
locations for the effective and feasible RCOs. Precisely, he can
specify where not to place RCOs, as their in these particular
elements of the model may be questionable.
For instance, based on the risk model or RoPax, as presented in
Fig. 1, we would like to know what are the best, effective and
feasible options to control the risk. Let us assume that the results
of our crude analysis suggest that the most effective way to reduce
the risk metric to an acceptable level is to (see [41])
 reduce the collision angle (α);
 reduced the time to capsize (T_caps);
 decrease the probability of an accident (P_a).
Moreover, we learn that α needs to be reduced to a certain
range to reduce the damage extent, which causes ﬂooding of a
RoPax or P_a should be lowered by an order of magnitude or
T_caps should be extended by 20%. Then it is up to the analyst or
decision-makers to
 specify whether the changes are attainable;
 specify the actions which are needed to make the changes; and
 prioritize them by their feasibility and the anticipated
effectiveness.
The effectiveness of RCOs can be quantiﬁed with reasonable
accuracy if they address the technical part of the model, i.e.
improving the crashworthiness of a ship structure, improving ship
post-accidental stability resulting in a longer capsize time. It is far
more complicated to evaluate the effectiveness of RCOs, which
address the socio-technical aspects of the modeled system, i.e.
measures to reduce the probability of an accident by inﬂuencing
the way in which a ship is navigated.
If there is a need to reduce a variable, which is not understood,
such as α and P_a in our example, which has medium to high
parameter importance, additional studies, on the causes of acci-
dents and the ways to mitigate them are needed. If our existing N
and K do not allow for justiﬁed conclusions, though the selected
RCOs are feasible their effect on the outcome cannot be measured
without ambiguity, meaning that surprises may occur.
A feasible and effective action might be to increase T_caps,
which means that the structure of a RoPax needs to be improved
stability-wise. Moreover the effectiveness of these RCOs seems to
be very high, as once they apply to the structure, in the case of a
collision, they are going to absorb certain amount of energy
according to the design and sustain certain extent of ﬂooding –
with a high degree of conﬁdence.
Fig. 1. Simpliﬁed risk model for open sea collision involving a RoPax ship. (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web
version of this article.)
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6. Conclusions
In this paper we present a risk perspective, which is suitable for
risk analysis and decision making for the maritime domain.
The risk is about future events, but its description is based on
experience gained in the past, which is a combination of our
knowledge of the analyzed system and an understanding of its
behavior. Therefore knowledge and understanding are inherent
parts of risk description, which in our view should be reﬂected
upon by an assessor. The distinction between knowledge and
understanding is evident among philosophers; however, it has not
received much speciﬁc attention among risk analysts yet. The
importance of seeing these two concepts separately and its
implication on the process of risk model development, uncertainty
analysis and selection of risk measures have been demonstrated.
To express the uncertainty in a qualitative manner a two-
dimensional scoring system has been proposed, where both
knowledge and understanding are implemented. The applicability
of the proposed perspective has been shown in an example where
a risk of a RoPax vessel suffering a collision with other ship is
analyzed.
The concept introduced here leads to systematic and transpar-
ent risk analysis, where all the requirements as speciﬁed by the
IMO in the Formal Safety Assessment guidelines can be met and
systematically incorporated.
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Table 2
Central elements of the risk model for a RoPax with the evidence on which the elements are based, see [41].
Model parameter Source Evidence for the parameter
1 Collision angle Literature Several empirical models; however, they are against understanding of this parameter, according to which this parameter
can be considered uniformly distributed between 0 and 180 deg.
2 Collision speed Literature Several empirical model; however, none of them are “true”, as the data used to developed them come from various areas
and address various types of navigation.
3 Collision mass ratio Model, data This parameter is derived from a model which simulates maritime trafﬁc. The model takes input data about maritime
trafﬁc recorded by Automatic Identiﬁcation System (AIS).
4 Damage extend
signiﬁcant
Assumption This variable is quantiﬁed through a conditional expression, which binds together variables 1, 2 and 3. The form of this
expression can be debatable.
5 Inner hull rupture Model A detailed numerical model giving reliable predictions is applied to quantify this model parameter. Model is understood
well enough and all its relevant limitations are known.
6 Stability conditions Literature,
assumption
This parameter is based on certain assumptions; scarce data available to support the assumptions.
7 Probability of ship
capsizing
Model A detailed and reliable numerical model is applied here. Main assumptions existing in the model are understood.
8 Wave height Data Long-term statistics on the wave heights for the analyzed sea area are used to quantify this parameter.
9 Time to capsize Model A reliable numerical model is applied here.
10 Time to evacuate Literature Recommendations given by the international Maritime Organization are utilized here. However, it is understood that
this approach may lead to bias, as the recommendations provide the upper limits for the evacuation time. In reality the
evacuation time can be shorter than given by the IMO. Some more sophisticated tools could be used to improve the
knowledge about the evacuation process.
11 Time of day Model Maritime trafﬁc simulator is utilized along with AIS data.
12 Probability of life loss in
ﬂooding
Assumption Linear, conditional function is applied, which connects variables 7, 9, and 10. This means that the quality of this variable
depends only on the quality of its parents.
13 Ship capacity Literature,
assumptions
The number of people on board is determined indirectly from the public reports provided by shipping companies
operating in the analyzed sea area. Certain assumptions are made based on data from the literature.
14 Number of fatalities Assumption This variable is quantiﬁed through a conditional expression, which binds together variables 9, 10, and 13.
15 Probability of collision Model, data Maritime trafﬁc simulator is used along with the available data about ship accidents in the analyzed sea area.
Table 3
Qualitative description of uncertainty associated with an exemplary risk model for a RoPax.
Model parameter Analyst's quality of knowledge Analyst's level of understanding Parameter uncertainty Parameter sensitivity Parameter importance
Collision angle L L–M H L M
Collision speed L L H L M
Collision mass ratio M M M H H
Damage extend signiﬁcant L–M M M–L L L
Inner hull rupture H H L L L
Stability conditions L H M H H
Probability of ship capsizing M M–H L–M M M
Wave height H H L L L
Time to capsize H M-H L L L
Time to evacuate M H L M M
Time of day M H L L L
Probability of life loss H M L L L
Ship capacity M M M L L
Number of fatalities H H L L L
Probability of collision M M M H M–H
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